What is magic? Part I
The most productive action we can take when discussing magic is not to use the word ‘magic’ at all. But to reach that point, we must recognize that there is a growing body of scholarship that does attempt to rescue the term; we can use this as a springboard to more productive – less misleading, less loaded – nomenclature for general use.1
First we will look at magic in one way of conceptualizing this mode of thought/action under that name, then progress to what I suggest is a more suitable word – which carries less stigma and misconception – for the same type of thinking and action.
As scholar of late Mediterranean antiquity Patricia Cox Miller notes:
Like the term “gnostic”, the term “magical” is problematic because of a negative theological bias that the word still carries from antiquity. What was called “magical” was considered by an earlier generation of scholars to be a debased form of religion in which conjuration replaced contemplation and arrogance toward the Gods replaced humble submission to them, but texts designated as “magical” have more recently been shown to be much more sophisticated and complex.2
Even though the situation is improving, if “magic” as a category of thought and action suffers so poorly in academia then it fares even worse in the popular imagination. Popular depictions – both fictional and non-fictional – give a skewed impression of different forms, types, mechanisms, and purposes of magic: Harry Potter, the Sorceror’s Apprentice, Bewitched, and so on. Entertaining though they may be – and even sometimes inspirational for those who make a more serious exploration of magic later – they nonetheless perpetuate simplified and inaccurate ideas about the meaning, potential, and use of magic. For those who criticize the idea of magic as “primitive”, “childish”, “backwards”, etc., far more often than not what they are dismissing is something based on one of these misleading strawmen rather than any knowledge of the practices and Weltanschauung of actual magicians (or of those who make a systematic study of the concept).
Defining, or at least describing, “magic”
What then is magic, in a non-fictional, non-ironic sense? One way to define magic, characterizing it as a particular category of actions resonant with a particular underlying conceptual model, is:
Magic is a form of operative communication that uses symbolic means to bring about a change in the practitioner (the one doing the magic), and when necessary this can bring about a change in the world outside the practitioner as well.
A conceptual model is a way of framing and categorizing phenomena and actions. Conceptual models aren’t judged by whether they are “true” (because they are not trying to convey truth); rather, their effectiveness and analytic power are the crucial criteria for whether they are useful. Conceptual models are ways of thinking about the assumptions, success criteria, and relevance of the things they are applied to – this contrasts with scientific models, which emphasize repeatability and measurable results. Magical thinking is a particular conceptual model that is useful in approaching actions and results that do not conform to strict chains of cause and effect.
Operative communication is communication which produces a tangible effect in the phenomenal world. One prescient example, increasingly cited by anthropologists and other writers on magical topics, is the performative speech of philosopher of language J.L. Austin3. Future posts will look more deeply at Austin’s work and its applicability to magic, but in brief performative speech is a particular category of speech that causes a change in the phenomenonal world merely by being spoken in the right context by someone with sufficient authority. The traditional mundane example of this is a sufficiently authorized individual solemnizing a marriage with the words “I now pronounce you husband and wife” – the marriage manifests as official precisely at that moment of utterance and as a direct, intentional consequence of that utterance. The same words uttered in jest by the same person outside of a wedding context would not have the same effect.
“Symbolic means” indicates that the conceptualization of both the current state of reality as perceived by the practitioner – and also the modified state of reality they desire to bring about – are predicated on the symbols utilized for describing these states. Symbols are a particular type of sign; see What is a sign? for an overview of signs. The salient concept here is that symbols – which are conventionally mediated; that is, have a meaning that is agreed upon by those who create or interpret these particular signs – reflect nuances of meaning and significance that can be altered to change the way reality is perceived or arranged through those symbols. For learning to discern and analyze the symbols and conventions at play in a particular situation, the works of Ronald Barthes are indespensible to the semiotic magician (or semiurgist; see below).
A “change in the practitioner” reveals that magic emphasizes striving toward results. Achieving results is far from a given; magic focuses on impelling – not compelling – people (including the magician!) and events to behave in certain ways. Results depend not just on the effectiveness of methods but also on the malleability of the structures acted upon. Magic acts most effectively within the gaps where reality is not yet firmly set into rigid structures4.
To be continued…..
Further Reading
- Epstein, Mikhail, “Semiurgy: From Language Analysis to Language Synthesis” in Russian Journal of Communication, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 2008).
- Otto, Bernd-Christian and Strausberg, Michael, ed. Defining Magic: A Reader. London: Routledge, 2013.
- Shell, Scott. The Application of Peircean Semiotics to the Elder Futhark Tradition. New York: Peter Lang, 2023.
- Sørensen, Jesper. A Cognitive Theory of Magic. Lanham, Md.: AltaMira, 2007.
- Tambiah, Stanley J. “The Magical Power of Words.” In Man. New series, vol. 3, no. 2 (June 1968).
Notes
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Magic as a term need not be discarded in all circumstances – for example, in certain groups and/or schools of magic where it is defined in a specific way so as to lessen the potential for miscommunication in those contexts. Outsiders to those schools will not understand magic in the same way as those within these intentional linguistic communities. The problem with most studies of magic, whether academic or aimed at popular audiences, is that they discuss and/or dismiss (or even ridicule) magic without ever defining what they mean by the term. Neglecting to offer a definition leaves it – intentionally or not – up to the reader to rely on whatever ideas they may have about magic even if those are ill-informed; the reader’s understanding of the text suffers thereby. ↩
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Patricia Cox Miller, “In Praise of Nonsense: A Piety of the Alphabet in Ancient Magic” in The Poetry of Thought in Late Antiquity, p241. ↩
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See Austin, J.L. How to Do Things With Words. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962. ↩
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This is often a matter of scale. Affecting the attitudes of other residents of your small town is comparatively easier than doing the same on a national scale. An effective magician knows what is within or just beyond their ability to affect, and chooses the objects of their magic accordingly. ↩